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1. INTRODUCTION
Can firms rationally engage in predatory pricing? That is, can they in
equilibrium choose to cut prices to lower their rivals' profits and thus
induce them to leave the market?
That question has been a long-standing point of controversy. While
some economists have claimed that predation has occurred, others, notably
McGee [1958], have argued that predation would never be rational. Recently,
Kreps-Wilson [1982] and Milgrom-Eoberts |.1982aj have shown that if with small
probability a firm is "crazy" and enjoys predation, then even if the firm is
"sane" it may choose to prey if entry occurs. In these papers, predation is
an investment in a reputation for "crazy" play. The fact that predation
reduces opponents' current profits is not crucial to the reputation-effects
story; what matters is that the predator signals that it is likely to prey in
the future. Thus these models do not quite correspond to the view that
predation aims at lowering opponents' profits. Nevertheless, reputation
effects may be a good model of predation in some cases of long-term
competition (These models require many periods in order for a small
probability of craziness to make a difference). The reputation-effects
models are similar in spirit to Milgrom-Robert's [l982b] paper on limit
pricing, in which an established firm tried to mislead entrants about its
costs by manipulating the pre-entry price. Here, the emphasis was on entry-
deterrence rather than on post-entry predation.
This paper offers a new explanation of predatory pricing which does not
depend on reputation effects. We assume that the entrant is uncertain of its
future profitability, and uses its current profit to decide whether or not to
remain in the market. Moreover, the established firm can take some competive
actions which are not (fully) observed by the entrant, such as secret price
cutting. Because these actions lower the distribution of the entrant's
realized profits, they increase the probability of exit and so the
established firm will compete more than it would if the entrant were certain
to remain active. This is predation, in the sense of lower prices (or higher
expenditures on non-price competition) than would have occurred were exit not
a factor. In equilibrium, the established firm "preys", reducing both its
own and the entrant's profits, even though the entrant is not "fooled" by the
predation and leaves the market only when it would have left without preda-
tion. Nevertheless, predation may be of some benefit to the predator,
because it lowers the expected profitability of entering the market. The
fact that the established firm can, on the margin, increase the probability
of exit by predation makes the threat to prey credible, thus discouraging
entry.
Our model is an example of a kind of signalling equilibrivim we call
"signal jamming". The predator's characteristics are common knowledge; it
changes its actions from the full-information ones not to signal its own
information but rather to "jam" or interfere with the inference problem faced
by the entrant, (while in our case "nature" is the one who sends the signal
which is jammed, signal jamming can also occur when the signal is sent by a
third player.) Other examples of signal jamming equilibria can be found in
Holmstrom's [1982] paper on marginal incentives, and in Riordan's [l985] paper
on "djmamic conjectural variations", which we discuss in more detail in the
next section.
After developing to our signal-jamming model, we show how to embed the
traditional long-purse story of predation in a model w^ith rational actors.
Ve do so by appealing to the work of Gale-Hellwig Ll9B3J on optimal debt
contracts with costly monitoring to show that if the entrant loses enough
equity it may be unable to raise capital for profitable investments. Thus we
offer two models of "predation without reputation", one old and one new.
2. THE SIGNAL-JAMMING MODEL
We focus on the simplest case with only two periods and perfect
correlation of the random terms over time. Later we will discuss the
ejrtensions to more periods and partial correlation. Signal jamming is based
on the entrant's need to infer its future profitability from its current
returns. We model this by assuming that the entrant is uncertain of its
(per-period) fixed costs, and is unable to observe these costs directly. We
motivate this unobservability by alluding to "agency problems" which prevent
the firms management from eliciting cost infornHtion from its managers.
We have in fact derived such an information blockage from a model in
which managers' utility fxmctions are as in Hart [l983J and managers face
moving costs in changing jobs. However, this paper studies predation not
agency, so we have not included a formal justification for the
unobservability of fixed costs. An alternative explanation of the entrant's
relying on its current profits for information would be that the entrant's
demand depends on a random parameter whose value is unknown to the entrant as
in ELordan [l985J- Riordan developed a two-period model of entry
accomodation with demand shocks and quantity competition. In the resulting
equilibrium, each firm's second-period output is decreasing in the observed
first-period price and thus, is decreasing in its opponent's (unobserved)
output. These "negative dynamic conjectural variations" lead the firms to
choose larger first-period outputs than in Static Nash equilibrium'' .
Riordan's paper differs from ours in its focus on entry accomodation, as
opposed to entry deterrence, and in the comparative statics it considers.
Our specification of fixed costs, rather than demand, as the uncertain
variable leads to a more tractable model, because with this specification the
first-period observations influence only the entrant's decision whether to
remain active, and not its marginal trade-offs and second-period price. This
allows us to fold back the second-period equilibrium, replacing it with the
ezpected payoffs, and conclude that the entrant will remain active if its
first-period profit is sufficiently high.
We will call the incumbent "firm one" and the entrant "firm two". For
the moment let the first period be "period A" and the second period "period
B", so that, for example, firm one's second-period price is p . Period B
will soon be folded back and we will then be able to drop the superscripts.
Let us introduce some more notation. Let IT (p. ,Pp) denote firm i's per
period gross profit function. Let a denote the entrant's fixed cost in the
first (and second) period, a is distributed on [a_,a] with cumulative
distribution function F(a) and continuous density dF(a)=f(a)da. As firm
one's exit is not an issue, we can normalize its fixed cost to be zero. If
the entrant stays in period B, the two firms obtain their Bertrand-Nash
1 2
profits (n ,11 -a). So under complete information, the entrant will stay if
A A
2
and only if a<Q;=II . If it leaves, then the incumbent makes its monopoly
As suggested by the work of Bulow-Geanakoplos-Klemperer [ 1985 J and
Fudenberg-Tirole [l984], this conclusion is reversed if firms compete in
prices, not quantities, and their products are differentiated.
profit n (p?,")i where p. is the incumbent's monopoly price.
Firm i tries to maximize its expected total profit V , where:
I (p<>Po)*n (p^,p^) if firm two remains active in period B;
^
rnnp;.p^2)^nU :
V =1
. . .
n''(p|,P2)+nVp",»), otherwise;
n (p,,p^)-ct +rr(p^,p^)-a if firm two remains active in period B;
In (p.,Pp)-ct, otherwise.
(To simplify notation, we ignore discounting).
Let subscripts denote partial differentiation, so that, for example,
n. „ is the cross partial of 11 with respect to p. and p . We will assume:
Al) The n are three times continuously differentiable, and for p.
and p such that lf>0, I^A 0, lf:>0,II^ .>0, and ^^^ in^2'^^12^2'
Let E.(p.) be firm i's static reaction function; that is, R (p )
solves:
(1) ^2^^1^ " argmax E H (p^,P2)'
^2
The reaction functions are differentiable and slope up from (A1 ) . Moreover,
the last part of (A1) ensures that the reaction functions intersect at most
once. If, as we assume, such an intersection exists, it will be the (unique)
pure-strategy equilibrium of the static Bertrand game.
A2) The reaction functions R. and Rp have a (unique) intersection
The following assunption is for technical convenience.
A3) Tne density f(a) is smooth and bounded away from zero.
Let rr=n (p.,Pp)« in the last period the incumbent has no incentive to prey,
and if the entrant is active it will receive IT -a. With complete
information, the entrant would then choose to remain active if a<a=U. and
would exit otherwise. For our problem to be interesting the exit decision
mist df^pend on a, which we assume in (A4).
(A4) £<Q:<a.
(A4) implies that in the Bertrand equilibrium the entrant has
positive output, (otherwise its profit would be negative for any positive
fixed cost) and thus that at that equilibrium its payoff is sensitive to the
incumbent's price:
(A4') n^(p^,P2)>o.
Let us now state the informational assun^jtions. Firm two's fixed cost
is not directly observable by any firm. Futhermore, firm two does not
observe (even ex-post) the price charged by firm one; firm one may or may not
observe firm two's price (for consistency we may as well assume that it does
not). All other variables are common knowledge.
The assumption that firms do not observe their rival's price deserves
some comment. We have in mind the following situation: the firms sell to a
small number of customers and their discounts under the list price are not
public information (see e.g., Scherer [1980], page 222). Alternatively we
could think of firm one engaging in "non-price predation", say by increasing
its (unobservable) advertising expenditures.
Now we can work out the necessary conditions for equilibrium play in
the first period. The entrant will not be misled by the incumbent's
predation, and thus will leave the market exactly when the net profit reveals
A
that a is above a . Call this cut-off net profit N*. Moreover, the entrant
can do no better than choose p„ to maximize its first-period profit that is,
p„ will be on the entrant's reaction curve. Finally we must determine the
incumbent's first-period price, given that the entrant will leave the market
2 A
whenever II < N*. If the incumbent sets p. so that the probability of exit is
A
strictly between zero and one, then the optimal choice of p. sets the
marginal first-period gain from increasing p. equal to the marginal change in
the probability the entrant stays active times the value of inducing exit.
(We know that in a pure strategy equilibrium, the probability of exit is the
same as \mder complete information, and therefore is strictly between and
1 .) If we define this latter value to be A=(n (p^,=>)-II ), we have the
.
*
following necessary conditions for first-period equilibrium prices (p,
,
^2^Pl^^ ^^"^ exit rule "leave if net profit is less than N*"
(2a) K* =n2[p*,R2(P*)]-°:
(2b) n\ (p*,R2(p*) )=A- f(a) -n^ (p*,R2(P*) )
•
The first equation says that in equilibrixim the entrant is not fooled,
and the second equation is the first-order condition for the incumbent's
choice of p. . We wish to provide conditions ensuring that (i) a solution to
the system (2a), (2b) exists, and (ii) such a solution is in fact an
equilibrium. We give sufficient conditions for (i) in terms of exogeneous
variables, but our conditions for (ii) to be obtained can only be checked
after computing a candidate equilibrium satisfying (2a), (2b). For this
reason, and for ease of exposition, we treat (i) and (ii) separately. The
Appendix presents an example with quadratic pay-offs and a uniform
distribution which satisfies all the assun5)tions and conditions we will
invoke. While this is the only example we have solved, we present tne
general case in the text because we feel that doing so makes clear which
features of quadratic-uniform example are important for our results.
The incumbent's first-period choice problem will have a maximum at
prices satisfying (2b) if it is locally concave, that is if:
(3) n]^-A.[fii^^-f(n^2)^)<o.
(A5) Equation (3) is satisfied (at least when the first-order
condition 2b is satisfied)
.
(A5) holds if n is quadratic and the density f is uniform.
To ensure that the system (2a), (2b) has a solution we must rule out a
comer solution at p.=0:
(A6) lim n^(p^,R2(Pi))=0
p^-^0
(A6) says that the marginal loss to the entrant caused by a decrease
in the incumbent's price when the entrant responds optimally is small when
the incumbent's price is low. The intuition is that for sufficiently low p
the entrant will choose not to produce, and will thus not be affected by the
incumbent's price.
Lemma: Under (A1) to (Ad) there is at least one solution (p.,K ) to (2a),
(2b).
Proof: Equation (2b) is independent of equation (2a), so to find an
*
equilibriiim we can first find a p. that satisfies (2b) and then plug it into
(2a) to find N . Both sides of (2b) are continuous, the left-hand side of
(2b) exceeds the right for small p. from (A6), and when p is the Bertrand
^ *
price p the inequality is reversed from (A4'). Thus there is a p that
solves (2b). Q.E.D.
,
* *.
A given solution (p. ,N ) need not be an equilibrium because we have not
yet checked that the incumbent's choice problem is globally concave.
Equations (2b) and (3) hold only for p. which result in a probability of exit
strictly between zero and one. If lr(p ,R (p ) }-ot<n (p ,R (p )j-a, firm two
will observe an "impossibly small" first-period profit, i.e., a profit lower
than it expected could occur in equilibrium. We will specify that such ob-
servations make firm two exit with probability one. Thus in this region firm
1 ^ 1
one's profit is 11 (p ,R (p ))+A. Since 11 is concave in p., and1**1 1
n. (p. ,R (p )J is positive, 11 cannot have a maximum in this region. However,
we need an additional assumption to ensure that the incumbent does not prefer
to deviate to prices so high that exit never occurs. (Otherwise no pure
strategy equilibriiim would exist as we know that in equilibrium some exit
must occur). Once again, as p does not influence the entrant's exit
decision, the best the incumbent can do is to maximize its first-period
IJ
profit, which yields at most n [R (K^(p )J,K (,p )J. Thus we require
(A7) Prob(a<a)A*n\p*,R2(p*) )>n\ R^ (R^Cp* ) ), R^lp*) ) •
*
(at) is a condition that includes the endogenous variable p . It holds
*
immediately if the incumbent's best response R (Rp(p )J is lower than the
*
price that just induces certain entry. This price, which we call d(p ), is
given by
(4) n^(d(p*), R2(p*))-n^(p*,R2(p*))=a -a.
If R. (R„(p, ) J<d(p, ) , then the incumbent's payoff function is single-
peaked. This will be the case, loosely speaking, if a is large so that a
has a wide support. This will also be the case in the "noisy" version of the
model we discuss at the end of the section. If R. (Rp(p.) )>d(p. ), then the
incumbent's payoff has two local maxima, but if A is "large enough" then p.
maximizes the incumbent's payoff.
Proposition 1 ; A solution (p.,R„(p.)) to {(2a), (2b)} which satisfies (AY) is
an equilibrium.
¥e do not know whether an equilibrium exists when (A?) is not
satisfied. Given (A?), we have found an equilibrium, and can do (local)
con5)arative statics. (The qualifier "local" is needed because we have not
shown that the equilibriim is unique.) Examining equation (2b), we see that
increasing the value of exit, A, increases the incumbent's incentive to prey,
*
and thus might be expected to lower p.. This intuition need not be correct
11
given our assumptions so far. Assumption (A5) guaranteed that the partial
derivative with respect to p. of the incumbent's first-order condition (2b)
was negative, but for comparative statics (and tne uniqueness of equilibrium)
we need this to be true of the total derivative. This total derivative is
given in equation (4).
(4) [nj^-fAn2^]+(n]2+n22Af)R'.
The sign of the term in square brackets is indeterminate while the
second term is positive. Signing equation (4) would require assumptions on
2
the third derivatives of H , in order to bound R' . Instead for comparative
statics we assume that (4) is negative.
Proposition 2 ; At an equilibrium where equation (4) is negative,
»
KO.
*
dp,
dA
We remind the reader that our many assumptions and conditions are
satisfied in the quadratic-uniform example of the Appendiz, for which the
equilibriiun is unique and Proposition 2 applies.
*
One might wonder as well how p. changes with the density f(a). The
term f(a) enters equation (2b) multiplicatively with A, so that the key is
how the density changes at the cutoff level. For most densities, this
question is difficult to answer. However, for the uniform distribution
considered in the Appendix, decreasing the variance of f while keeping a
inside its support ("more information") increases f(a) and thus lowers p.!
Thus the better the information the more predation occurs, so that the
equilibrium is discontinuous at perfect information. Two comments are in
order on this result. First, the result requires keeping the probability
12
that g exceeds a constant , to ensure that (A7) is satisfied. If we think of
a "general" class of uniform distributions, as we shrink the support we are
A
"unlikely" to converge down to a; instead we would expect to converge to a
non-predation equilibrium in which either the entrant always leaves (a below
A
the support) or always stays (a above it). Second, given a "narrow" uniform
A
distribution centered at a, the result is really not surprising. If we
consider starting at the full-information equilibriuin price, a small decrease
in the incumbent's price is fairly inexpensive, because 11 =0, yet yields a
large increment in exit, because the entrant thinks there's lots of
*
information in its low-variance profit. In equilibrium p must decrease
enough to compensate for the high "efficiency" of predation.
The possible discontinuity of p. in the support of a is the opposite of
a result in Holmstrom's [1982] paper on managerial incentives. In Holmstom's
model, a manager expends effort to mislead the market about her ability,
because effort and ability are confounded in the manager's observed
performance. Holmstrom shows that as the variance of the manager's ability
decreases (the equivalent of shrinking the support of a) the manager expends
less effort. As Holmstom's model has transitoiy randomness in performance
("noise") as well as random abilities, one migiht speculate that the
discontinuity we found would disappear if we introduced noise. This is not
the case. We have considered a variant of the quadratic-uniform model of the
Appendix with a uniformly distributed noise term added to first-period
profits. In that model, p* is independent of the support of a once that
support is sufficiently small, but still less than the Bertrand price, so
13
that the discontinuity persists. Tne discontinuity would also occur with
Holmstrom' s normal-normal stocnastic specification, provided that the critical
level g was the median of the support of a . Otherwise, the comparative statics
considered by Holmstrom, namely decreasing the variance of a, would lead either
to Prob (a < a) = e or Prob (a < a) = 1 - e, e small, and in either case there
would be no predation with little uncertainty about a. The requirement that a
be the median of a is the analog of our shrinking the support of a uniform
A
distribution without changing the probability that a exceeds a. We conclude
that, with or without noise, when there is good but not perfect information
9
about a then predation may well be heavy if it occurs at all .
In equilibrium, predation does not "fool" the entrant, and thus the
entrant leaves the market in exactly the same states as it would without
predation. However, the predation does lower the entrant's profits. Thus if
we now work backwards to consider the entry decision, the entrant will enter
less often than if predation did not occur. Continuing to work backwards, we
can add a third period to the beginning of the game. If the shock a is
perfectly correlated over all three periods, then predation will only occur
in the first period, and thus there will be the same amount of exit as
without predation. If however, the shocks are imperfectly correlated, then
there will be predation in both the first and the second periods. Because of
the second-period predation, there will be more exit at
^We thank Bob Gibbons for encouraging us to consider the relationship of our
model to Holmstrom' s, and for working out the equilibrium in Holmstrom'
s
model with uniform distributions of ability and noise. Holmstrom' s model
differs. .from ours in an additional way not mentioned in the test; in
Holmstrom, the "payoff" to signal-jamming is the change induced in the
expected value of a, and not the change in the probability that a exceeds a.
Thus, when ability has a tight support, there is little payoff to signal-
jamming, while in our model, the payoff is independent of the support of
fixed costs. For this reason, discontinuities at the full-information limit
do not arise in Holmstrom' s model, even with our uniform-uniform specification.
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the end of the first period txian without predation, for the same reason there
was less entry in the two-period model. With three periods and imperfect
correlation, firms (or more precisely "types" of the entrant) will enter and
then exit who would have stayed in the market without predation.
5. An alternative theory of predation without reputation: the long purse
story
We have shown that a firm may want to jam its opponent's informiition to
encourage the latter 's exit. The long purse story is a more traditional
explanation of predation without reputation. If firms have financial
constraints, they have on incentive to reduce its their opponents' current
profits. The preyed-upon firms may then be forced to exit (or more
generally reduce their activity) because of the impossibility of renewing
capital or financing new projects.
Until now the long purse stoiy has remained veiy informal, and as a
consequence some authors have doubted about its validity. Indeed in a world
of perfect information such predation cannot occur. Bygones are bygones, and
a firm's loss of money has no impact on its prospects, so current predation
will not affect future financing and is useless. In other words, in a
perfect information world firms do not face financial constraints. (See
McGee [1958]; see also Benoit [1983], who provides a game-theoretic analysis
of predation with exogoneous limits on the losses that firms can sustain and
remain active). Recent research on borrowing under asymmetric information
has provided a foundation for the assunytion of financial constraints.
We here simply demonstrate that the long purse story is a direct spinoff of
this research and we compare it with the signal-jamming story. Consider the
bsimplified versiou of tne one-period model developed by Gale-Hellwig
[1985] (see also Diamond Ll9ci4j):
A debtor has a potential project with random payoff (gross of
investment) n>0. The cumulative distribution function is F(n). This project
requires a capital investment K. Assume E(n)>K. The debtor has initial
wealth E<K. As we will see below, the debtor finances as much as he can
through his own funds. To finance the rest, he can sign a contract with a
(competitive) bank. The bank pays a cost a>0 if it decides to monitor the
debtor's erpost payoff H. Furthermore bankruptcy laws prevent the bank from
taking more money from the debtor than the latter owns. Gale and Hellwig
have shown that the optimal contract between the debtor and the bank takes
the simple "standard debt contract" form: Either the debtor decides to
reimburse a fixed amount R to the bank and there is no auditing, or the
latter audits and then confiscates 11. The debtor then defaults if and only
if n<R.
The zero-profit condition for the bank is:
(5) n^=(l-F(R))R+/Q ndF(n)-aF(R)-(K-E)=0.
R is the lowest root (if any) satisfying equation (5). If there is no root
to equation (5) i the debtor cannot find a bank to finance the project: one
can then posit R=+«>.
The debtor's extra profit from this project is then:
(6) rP=max{0,-E+/°(n-R)dF(n)} .
A straightforward analysis of equation (5) and (6) shows that
a) R is greater than (K-E) and is nonincreasing with the loan (K-E),
b) the debtor's profit IT is nondecreasing with E.
Id
Let us show tnat wnen E is sufficiently small, for a sufficiently big,
there is no loan contract which is acceptable to both parties. To this
purpose subtract (6) from (5). One sees that if _R is the lowest R such that
n =0, then
n-^=(E(n)-K)-aF(R),
i.e., the bank's profit is equal to the complete information aggregate profit
mi]ius the expected auditing cost. Note that R does not depend on a. Now if
a is "big", n is negative at R_. If we assume that U is an increasing
fiinction of R , then the bank stops lending before the debtor decides not
to apply for a loan. If a is "small", il is positive at R^, and the debtor
may decide not to apply even though its project could be financed. The
conclusion of this study is that the lower the debtor's wealth, the less
likely is the financing of the project .
To see how we can base a long purse story on this, consider a two-
period model of competition between two firms in which a) the second period
investment of firm two, say, must be financed through debt, b) debt
contracts are short-rim (one-period) debt contracts and c) the random
variables influencing profits are not correlated over time, c) is not
crucial and just serves to make sure that no predation through signal jamm.ing
or through more traditional signalling (limit pricing, war of attrition,
reputation models) can occur. Then it may pay for firm one to prey in the
first period. Doing so reduces firm two's equity in the second period and
therefore makes firm two's investment less attractive to the firm and to the
banks.
^This need notJbe the case, but it is true, for example, if
F(n)=1e-^.
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So, using the Gale-Hellwig model, we have built a consistent model of
the long purse story. A firm with more cash flow has a higher probability of
staying in the market . Of course more complex models would give a more
sensible description of the long-purse story. For instance the extreme
observability assumption of the bankruptcy model should be relaxed. And
mainly one would expect predation to often occur when a small firm enters a
market (at least as far as the long purse story is concerned). Then, in the
terminology of the above model, this firm (firm two) will certainly need
financing from the first period on. This strengthens the case for the study
of long-riri debt contracts: in the above we had one-period debt contracts in
a two-period model. We are confident that future research on financing under
asymmetric information will lead to a more coherent theory of the long purse
story.
We ought to compare the signal jamming and the long-purse stories.
Signal jamming, like the previous models of predation, relies on the
predator's influencing beliefs and the correlation of uncertainty over time.
The long purse story does not require such correlation; instead predation
affects tangible variables (wealth levels). Another, related, difference is
that predation may occur and at the same time not be successful in the signal
jamming model. It seems, from the above model and the work of Benoit [l983],
that predation to affect financial constraints occurs only if it is
successful, at least with some positive probability. Lastly, what
differentiates these two stories from the previous theories of predation
(limit pricing, war of attrition and reputation models) is that the predator
Although this does not mean that it faces a "quieter" market: if firm one
chooses to prey after all, predation may be tougher in order to be
successful.
IS
does not try to convey any information about itself. So, as we mentioned in
the introduction, no reputation is involved.
19
ADTiendix
This Appendix shows that (A1) through (A?) are satisfied in the case of
quadratic payoffs 11 and a uniform distribution over a, and solves explicitly
for the equilibrium. We derive the quadratic payoffs from price competition
within a Hotelling model with differentiated products on each end of a unit
interval, linear transportation costs t, and constant average cost c. In
this model, static profits are given by
(p^-c) if Pj>Pj_+t,
n^(p,P^)=i (p,-c) (pj-v;t) .f p^+t>p,>p,-t,
2t - J
1
othei*wise.
It is easy to check that these payoffs satisfy (A1 ) . Firm two's static
reaction curve if Rp(p. )=max[c,^j ). The reaction curves have a unique
2
intersection, at which both firms' prices are above cost so that (A4') is
satisfied. We assume that a is uniformly distributed on [a_,a], with the
static Bertrand profit, a =(£+a)/2.
¥e now proceed to solve for firm one's first-period equilibrium price.
Recall equation (2b),
(2b) n^^(p*,E2(p*))=^*f(^)-n?(p*.R2^P^^-
In this example equation (2b) becomes
*
, . P,+t-c
(7) ^ (p^-c-t)=A-f(a). '^^ , so that
20
assuming that the first-order condition (2b) is sufficient for the
2
incumbent's maximization. Since f'=II =0, equation (5) is negative, so that
the incumbent's choice problem is locally concave and (A5) is satisfied.
«
(A6) is satisfied but irrelevant because p.>0. The important condition is
*
(at): given that the entrant expects p., does the incumbent prefer to
He
deviate to a price above d(p )? Now condition (A?) depends on A, the value
of entry deterrence, which in the model presented so far is infinite, because
there is no outside good. Introducing an outside good of value u means that
a consumer at distance y will buy from a monopolist only if p+ty<u; so that
by varying u (but keeping it high enough that the static Bertrand equilibrium
is unaffected) we can make A as large as we please.
Moreover, for A large enough we can show (A7) is satisfied, so that we
do have a (unique) equilibrium.
*
Now we turn to the comparative statics. As A increases, p. decreases
and converges to c-t, the price at which the incumbent captures the entire
market. Changing f(a) is more complicated because there are many ways to do
it. Consider increasing £ and decreasing a so as to keep Prob(ci:<a) a
constant and in particular maintaining a_<a<a. In this case p,->-c-t so that
the "better the information" the lower the price. Now the reader may be
concerned that this surprising result is not an equilibrium because the
global concavity conditions are not satisfied for very concentrated
distributions. However, if f(a) is a constant, the incumbent's first-period
loss to playing p converges to -t and playing p yields him Prob(a>a)*A in
expected second-period profits. If A is sufficiently large then it pays to
invest in signal-jamming in the first-period, rather than deviating to
R (R (p. )), which maximizes first-period profit but induces no exit.
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